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ESSAY
EXPECTING  THE  UNEXPECTED
Mark A. Lemley*
INTRODUCTION
Patent law rewards invention.  Invention in turn means not merely that
something is new, but that it is nonobvious—something that ordinary scien-
tists in the field wouldn’t have figured out.  We have a number of legal doc-
trines designed to decide whether an invention would be obvious to those in
the field.  One of the most important of those doctrines is the doctrine of
“unexpected results.”  If the patentee’s invention produced unexpected
results, the law says, that is pretty good evidence that it wasn’t obvious.
A second important doctrine, established in the law only in 2007, is that
if it is obvious to try to make something, and if those who might try would
expect to succeed, making that thing is not patentable.  After all, if an ordi-
nary scientist would think to try a particular approach and would expect to
succeed, actually doing so isn’t really inventive.  It’s just the ordinary work we
expect of scientists.
These two doctrines can conflict.  What if it is obvious to try something,
but actually trying it leads to unexpected results?  This actually happens with
some frequency, particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries,
where researchers are motivated to try various standard modifications of
known chemicals but where the unpredictability of the art means that they
can expect to be surprised by what they learn from time to time.  Perhaps
surprisingly, courts have not yet decided how to resolve this conflict, with a
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number of cases in the last several years preferring one doctrine or the other
without directly acknowledging the conflict.
I argue that when these two legal doctrines conflict, the doctrine of
unexpected results must give way.  Obviousness is based on the idea that we
should not give a patent if ordinary scientists could have gotten to the result
without the encouragement of that patent.1  If researchers of ordinary skill
were already motivated to try a new variation, and correctly expected that
they would succeed, actually trying the new variation is normal science lack-
ing the extra skill or insight required for invention.  And if scientists would
have created the new variation in the ordinary course of their duties, they
would of necessity have stumbled upon the unexpected results.  Normal sci-
ence, not the incentive of a patent, led them to that outcome, so the inven-
tion is not patentable.
This result may alarm patent owners in the pharmaceutical industries,
who have been obtaining patents for this sort of normal experimentation for
years.  But I think it is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., which held that an invention was not patenta-
ble if it was obvious to try.2  While pharmaceutical patent owners may lament
the loss of these patents, the rest of the world may not.  Patents likely to be
affected by the obvious-to-try rule tend to be follow-on patents used to try to
extend the life of expired patents on new chemical entities, not break-
through drugs that require strong protection.  And pharmaceutical patent
owners may have other avenues to obtain protection they legitimately need.
Thinking about the tension between unexpected results and obviousness
to try also offers a window on why we have an obviousness doctrine at all.
KSR’s focus on obviousness to try may represent a fundamental shift in think-
ing about obviousness, from a focus on whether the result was expected to a
focus on whether the process of getting to that result was conventional.
1 Abramowicz and Duffy argue that the role of nonobviousness is to identify those
inventions that would not have occurred but for the promise of a patent, and grant patents
only to those inventions. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard
of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590 (2011).  I mostly, but not completely, agree with that
formulation.  Abramowicz and Duffy are correct that we should not grant patents to inven-
tions that would be made without the grant of the patent; the grant of an exclusive right in
such a case is social waste.  But their inducement standard suggests that we might grant
patents even to things that are not inventive if they are costly enough that no one will
produce them without the promise of exclusivity. See also Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable
Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 517–31 (2009) (arguing for
patent protection for old inventions in the pharmaceutical industry).  Patent law does not
currently protect the “sweat of the brow” unaccompanied by invention. See In re Kubin,
561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Other legal doctrines may create exclusivities to
encourage companies to spend money on non-inventive activities; I discuss those ideas
below.
2 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
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I. THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS
A. The Primary Analysis
We grant patents only to inventions that are novel and nonobvious—
ones that an ordinary scientist in the field would not have come up with.
Obviousness is the “ultimate condition” of patentability—the single most sig-
nificant doctrine dividing those ideas worth granting a patent on from run-
of-the-mill work that does not deserve a patent.3  As the Supreme Court
made clear in KSR, an ordinarily skilled researcher is “not an automaton,”
but a scientist who is a problem-solver and will be motivated to improve
things in the ordinary course of scientific work.4
The nonobviousness requirement—that inventions must, to qualify for a
patent, be not simply new but sufficiently different that they would not have
been obvious to the ordinarily skilled scientist—is in dispute in almost every
case, and it is responsible for invalidating more patents than any other patent
rule.5  It is also perhaps the most vexing doctrine to apply, in significant part
because the ultimate question of obviousness has an “I know it when I see it”
quality that is hard to break down into objective elements.6
That hasn’t stopped the Federal Circuit from trying to find those objec-
tive elements.  In the last quarter-century, the court has created a variety of
rules designed to cabin the obviousness inquiry.7  Some of those rules—that
an invention can’t be obvious unless there is a teaching, suggestion, or moti-
vation to combine prior art elements or modify existing technology,8 and
that an invention can’t be obvious merely because it is obvious to try9—were
swept away by the Supreme Court in 2007.  In KSR, the Court insisted on
context-specific standards rather than rigid rules.10
B. Secondary Considerations (or Objective Evidence)
A second body of Federal Circuit obviousness precedent remained
unchanged by KSR, however.  Those cases involve the so-called “secondary
3 NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Wither-
spoon ed., 1980).
4 KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
5 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 209 tbl.2 (1998); cf. John R. Allison et al., Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (2014) (finding an equal
number of invalidations on obviousness and anticipation grounds).
6 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inven-
tions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (2008).  Portions of this paragraph and the next are
adapted from that article.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak,
175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
9 See, e.g., In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
10 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
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considerations” or “objective evidence” of nonobviousness.11  While the basic
obviousness inquiry is focused on what a hypothetical reasonable expert—the
person having ordinary skill in the art, or “PHOSITA”12—would think is obvi-
ous, courts also consider real-world evidence about how the invention was
received in the marketplace.  These secondary considerations may include,
for instance, whether the invention was a commercial success, whether others
tried and failed to achieve it, and how the inventor was treated by the rele-
vant scientific community.13  Secondary considerations have taken on greater
significance since KSR as patentees have turned to them to try to overcome
the stricter primary test of obviousness.14
For our purposes, the most important of the objective considerations is
unexpected results.  The paradigm case of unexpected results is United States
v. Adams.15  Adams invented a just-add-water battery with a long shelf life that
produced a stable current.16  Prior literature had indicated that the elements
of the battery could not safely be combined together and might even
explode.17  While the prior art disclosed each of the elements of Adams’s
battery separately, the Court held that the combination of those elements was
11 Whether you call them “secondary considerations” or “objective evidence” may
depend on how much weight you want to give these factors.  After all, “secondary consider-
ations” seem, well, secondary, while “objective evidence” sounds like the sort of decision-
making criteria to which we all should aspire.  Notably, the Supreme Court speaks of
secondary considerations that “may have relevancy,” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
18 (1966), while the Federal Circuit prefers the term “objective evidence” and has elevated
these considerations to a necessary part of the obviousness analysis, see Greenwood v. Hat-
tori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1990); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[O]bjective evidence of nonobviousness . . .
should when present always be considered as an integral part of the analysis.”).  I will use
the two terms interchangeably, doubtless to the chagrin of both sides.
12 For discussion of the role of the PHOSITA in patent law, see for example Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155,
1185–90 (2002); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Per-
spective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The
Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37 (1991);
see also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 4.3 (5th ed. 2001); Joseph
P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Person-
age, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002).  The first known use of the term PHOSITA appears to be
in Cyril A. Soans, Some Absurd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. RES & ED. 433, 438 (1966).
13 For discussion of those factors, see for example Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Fed-
eral Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch,
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293; Robert P.
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 803 (1988).
14 See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 6, at 996; Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Consider-
ations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2083 (2011).
15 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
16 Id. at 43.
17 Id. at 47.
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nonobvious, relying on the unexpected nature of his results to those of skill
in the art.18  The fact that no one expected Adams’s battery to work meant
that people of ordinary skill in the field wouldn’t try making it.  That Adams
did—and succeeded—was deserving of a patent.19
Adams was a case involving not only unexpected results, but also what
patent law calls “teaching away” from the invention.  It wasn’t just that the
prior art didn’t expect Adams’s success, but that the prevailing wisdom told
him not to bother trying.  Indeed, he demonstrated his battery for Army
experts, who refused to believe it could work even after seeing the results
with their own eyes.20  The rationale here seems straightforward: if the
PHOSITAs thought that something wouldn’t work, and the patentee showed
that, surprisingly, it did, the patentee’s discovery was likely not obvious to
those PHOSITAs.21
Patentees frequently present evidence of their unexpected results, and
the Federal Circuit has considered that evidence in a large number of cases,
essentially always as evidence in support of the patentee and a finding of
nonobviousness.22  By contrast, the absence of a secondary consideration like
unexpected results is not treated as evidence of obviousness.  Instead, it is
neutral.23  Unexpected results are treated as a reason to treat the invention
as nonobvious.  In fact, however, they are more properly understood as indi-
rect evidence that bears on the question of whether the PHOSITA would
have been motivated to make the invention.
C. Obvious to Try
While objective evidence of unexpected results can trace its pedigree at
least as far back as the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Graham v. John Deere
Co.,24 the other doctrine of interest to us is of more recent vintage.  That
18 Id. at 51–52.
19 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (pointing to Adams and
explaining that “[t]he fact that the elements worked together in an unexpected and fruit-
ful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’ design was not obvious to those skilled
in the art”).
20 Adams, 383 U.S. at 43–44.
21 As an aside, the law’s reliance on unexpected results makes sense only if we think of
the actual development and testing of an invention, rather than just a new idea, as central
to what makes an invention.  If the idea itself is all that matters, we shouldn’t care whether
or not it has unexpected results, something we learn only by implementing it.  For an
argument that the law should pay more attention to building and testing, not just thinking
of an invention, see Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2016).
22 See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1367–68
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 995–98
(Fed. Cir. 2009).  A Westlaw search for “unexpected results” in the Federal Circuit database
on Nov. 23, 2016, produced 387 opinions.
23 See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 (Fed. Cir.
1986)).
24 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
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doctrine concerns what to do when it would be obvious to the PHOSITA to
make a particular change to the prior art or test a new machine or com-
pound.  Scientists may be motivated to improve existing technology in a vari-
ety of standard ways without the need for a patent.  Some of those
improvements are the result of simple linear thinking that implements
existing knowledge; for example, if having one USB port on a computer is
good, why not try having two?  Others are optimization based on goals known
to be desirable even if the means is not; for example, if raising battery life on
a laptop from three to four hours is good, raising it to five hours should be
even better.
Just because ordinary scientists are motivated to try something doesn’t
mean they will succeed, however.  It is obviously desirable to build a time
machine25 or to cure cancer, but that doesn’t mean a scientist of ordinary
skill would know how to do it.  As the Federal Circuit put it, if “trying” simply
means throwing darts at a combinatorial dartboard to see what sticks, getting
the right answer is not obvious even if lots of people would like to get that
answer.26
The Federal Circuit originally drew from that logic the conclusion that
obviousness to try was irrelevant—that it was not the proper test for obvi-
ousness.  That mantra was repeated in a number of cases over a twenty-five-
year period.27  But frankly it never made much sense.  If something is obvi-
ous to try, scientists of ordinary skill will be motivated to try it.  That doesn’t
mean they will succeed, of course, as the cancer example proves.  But when
obviousness to try a particular approach is coupled with a reasonable expec-
tation of success, getting to the result is not inventive.  It requires only doing
what scientists in the field would both want and know how to do.28  Put
25 Well, except for the whole “killing your own grandmother” thing.  See for example
RENE´ BARJAVEL, LE VOYAGEUR IMPRUDENT (1944) (thought to be the first description of the
grandfather paradox), as well as a large fraction of science fiction novels written in the last
century.
If you did invent a time machine, the question of when to patent it is actually a compli-
cated one. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1, FUNAGAIN GAMES, https://www.funagain.com/con-
trol/product/~product_id=12373/~affil=BSFS (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) (describing a
game designed by Falko Goettsch and James Ernst—the premise of which is that you have
invented a time machine, but must now race back through time to patent it before other
inventors of a time machine).
26 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a defendant merely
throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities, courts
should not succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness.”).
27 See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“‘Obvious to try’ has long
been held not to constitute obviousness. A general incentive does not make obvious a particular
result, nor does the existence of techniques by which those efforts can be carried out.”
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed.
Cir. 1988))); cf. id. (stating that a reasonable expectation of success is all that is required
for obviousness, but nonetheless rejecting obviousness to try).
28 Some judges had pointed to the language in 35 U.S.C. § 103 that “[p]atentability
shall not be negatived [sic] by the manner in which the invention was made” as a justifica-
tion for rejecting obviousness to try.  Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed.
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another way, we should distinguish between obvious goals—such as to
“increase battery life” or “cure cancer”—and obvious means of achieving
those goals.  An obvious goal will motivate people to try new things, but that
doesn’t mean the invention is obvious unless ordinary scientists would also
have an obvious means of achieving those goals.
The Supreme Court so held in KSR v. Teleflex in 2007, overruling a quar-
ter-century of Federal Circuit precedent that had rejected obviousness to try:
The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in
error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that
the combination of elements was “[o]bvious to try.” When there is a design
need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of
identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason
to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.  If this leads
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense.  In that instance the fact that a combina-
tion was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.29
Thus, since 2007, the law has been that if it is obvious to try a particular
set of solutions and scientists expect that one of them will work, people of
ordinary skill will try them, and the resulting invention is not patentable
because the process that produced it was obvious.30
II. WHEN “OBVIOUS TO TRY” LEADS TO UNEXPECTED RESULTS
A. Why Does This Ever Happen?
KSR unintentionally set up a new conflict between the doctrines of obvi-
ousness to try and unexpected results.  How should courts treat circum-
stances in which an invention is obvious to try, and those who will try
reasonably anticipate that they will succeed, but the resulting product has
unexpected characteristics?  Does the fact that scientists were motivated to
Cir. 2007) (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (first alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)).  But that is
a non sequitur.  The reason an invention that is obvious to try is unpatentable is that the
PHOSITA can be expected to produce it without the incentive of a patent, not because of
the way the invention is made.  The statutory language is in fact designed with a different
purpose in mind—to permit patents on inventions made by accident.  Congress adopted
the language to reject the controversial “flash of genius” test previously adopted by the
Supreme Court in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). See Graham
v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (documenting Congress’s rejection of the term
“flash of genius”); Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185, 190 & n.24 (2009)
(“Congress inserted this language into § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act to put to rest the ‘flash
of genius’ theory of patentability.”).  And truly accidental inventions are surely not obvious
to try; indeed, they aren’t “tried” at all. See infra notes 91–97 and accompanying text.
29 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (alteration in original) (cita-
tions omitted).
30 Curiously, some have denied that KSR changed the law. See Andrew V. Trask, Note,
“Obvious to Try”: A Proper Patentability Standard in the Pharmaceutical Arts?, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2625 (2008).
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produce the invention, and reasonably expected that they would succeed,
mean that the invention is obvious?  Or does the fact that when they did
produce the predicted invention it had unexpected characteristics mean that
it was not obvious?31
I should begin by explaining why this problem comes up at all.  The
reader might doubt that both of these things can be true at the same time.
After all, if I know to try something, and I am reasonably confident it will
work, why should the result be unexpected?  One possibility, of course, is that
I thought it would work but it didn’t.  That is an unexpected result, but not
one that generally leads to a patent, because there is usually not much money
in patenting failures.32
A second possibility is that the technology is an uncertain one, so that
the PHOSITA cannot always predict the effects of seemingly small changes.
This has been true for some time in chemistry, for instance, particularly as
the size of molecules increases.  Chemists can often make small modifications
to an existing chemical and produce an analogue with similar properties.33
Sometimes, however, a small structural change results in a chemical with sig-
31 Chris Cotropia has discussed a similar conflict, which he refers to as “type II predict-
ability”—predictability as to results.  Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobvious-
ness in Patent Law After KSR, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 404–08 (2014).
Cotropia focuses on his claim that courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) are
misguided in relying on the ex post predictability of the effects of the invention once made
as evidence of nonobviousness when they should be focusing on “type I predictability”—
whether the inventor used the prior art predictably. Id. at 408–23.  That is different, and
in some sense the opposite, of the conflict I identify here, in which the desirability of
building the invention is evident, but the ultimate results are unexpected.
32 For an argument that we should disclose and record patent failures, see Sean B.
Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2012); cf. Michal Shur-Ofry, Access-
to-Error, 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 357 (2016) (arguing that the public should have
access to failures that might otherwise be treated as trade secrets).
33 As the Federal Circuit explained in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.:
To establish obviousness in cases involving new chemical compounds, the
accused infringer must identify some reason that would have led a chemist to
modify a known compound.  Generally, an obviousness inquiry concerning such
“known compounds” focuses on the identity of a “lead compound.”
A lead compound is a compound in the prior art that would be “a natural
choice for further development efforts.”  The motivation to modify that lead com-
pound can come from any number of sources and need not necessarily be
explicit in the art.  “[I]t is sufficient to show that the claimed and prior art com-
pounds possess a ‘sufficiently close relationship . . . to create an expectation,’ in
light of the totality of the prior art, that the new compound will have ‘similar
properties’ to the old.”
752 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (first quoting Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr.
Reddu’s Labs, Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008); then quoting Altana Pharma AG
v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2009); and then quoting Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (citing Takeda
Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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nificantly different properties.  Indeed, there is a whole body of caselaw
devoted to this situation.34
Finally, there are a number of circumstances in which a simple change
known to those of skill in the art has the predictable, but not deterministic,
possibility of producing different results.  Most pharmaceutical compounds,
for instance, are synthesized as a mixture of chemically distinct molecules
called stereoisomers.35  The most common type of stereoisomerism results
from so-called “chiral centers,” carbon atoms bonded to four different parts,
which can be either “right-handed” (R) or “left-handed” (S).36  When there
is only one chiral center in a compound, there will be two stereoisomers that
are mirror images of each other, called “enantiomers.”37  Enantiomers con-
tain the same atoms and have identical physical and chemical properties,
except that they rotate polarized light in opposite directions and react differ-
ently with other chiral molecules.38  When the mixture of enantiomers is
fifty-fifty, it is known as a “racemic” mixture, and the separation into enanti-
omers or “racemates” is sometimes called a “chiral switch.”39
Chemists long ago discovered that when a drug has effects in the very
chiral environment that is the human body, it is often only one enantiomer
of the drug that is doing the work, while the other is inert.40  In that common
case, removing the inert half of the mixture will, on average, double the
effectiveness of the same dosage of the drug, because the modified drug will
34 Whether a lead compound and a claimed compound have a sufficiently close rela-
tionship frequently turns on their “structural similarities and differences.”  Daiichi Sankyo
Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Otsuka, 678 F.3d
1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 700 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
35 Lien Ai Nguyen et al., Chiral Drugs: An Overview, 2 INT’L J. BIOMEDICAL SCI. 85, 85
(2006).
36 ROBERT J. OUELLETTE & J. DAVID RAWN, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: STRUCTURE, MECHA-
NISM, AND SYNTHESIS 242–43 (2014).
37 Id. at 243.  Where there is more than one chiral center in a molecule, there will be
more stereoisomers—for example, the RRS isomer and the RSR isomer—some of which
may be mirror images of each other, but, if not, are called “diastereomers.” Id. at 254–55.
Diastereomers frequently have different physical properties (melting points, solubility,
reactivity, etc.) and are less interchangeable than enantiomers. Id. at 255.  The following
discussion will assume a simple case, where there is only one stereocenter and two mirror-
image isomers.
38 Id. at 245–46.
39 Id. at 248–49; see also Israel Agranat et al., Putting Chirality to Work: The Strategy of
Chiral Switches, 1 NATURE REVS. 753, 757 (2002) (describing the most financially successful
chiral switch of all time—the racemic Prilosec (omeprazole) to the single-enantiomer Nex-
ium (esomeprazole) just before Prilosec went off patent).
40 As early as 1886, Arnaldo Piutti observed that the l-form of the amino acid aspara-
gine was tasteless, while the d-form was sweet. See Guo-Qiang Lin et al., Overview of Chirality
and Chiral Drugs, in CHIRAL DRUGS: CHEMISTRY AND BIOLOGICAL ACTION 3, 4 (Guo-Qiang
Lin et al. eds., 2011).  Nevertheless, synthesizing enantiomerically pure drugs on a com-
mercial scale wasn’t feasible until 1974, when William Knowles discovered a commercially
viable way to make L-DOPA, for which he shared a Nobel Prize in 2001. Id. at 9.  The chiral
drug industry didn’t really take off until the 1980s and 1990s. Id. at 21–22.
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have only the effective bits and not the inert ones.41  It is also sometimes the
case that while, say, the negative enantiomer is responsible for the therapeu-
tic benefits of the drug, the positive enantiomer is actually inhibiting those
benefits, so removing the positive enantiomer from the racemic mixture will
have a more than two-fold increase in the therapeutic effects of the drug.42
In rare cases, all the benefits will come from one enantiomer and all the side
effects will come from the other.43
In these latter two cases, the effect of separating the racemic mixture
into enantiomers is “unexpected” in the sense that we could not have known
in advance that there would be such a multiplier effect in this particular case.
Some enantiomers will have these effects, but not all will.  And a smaller sub-
set of enantiomers will have particular efficacy improvements.  At the same
time, scientists in the field are motivated to separate the enantiomers by the
likelihood that there would be at least some substantial improvement in the
efficacy of the drug,44 so they are motivated to separate the mixture even
apart from the possibility of a multiplier effect.  They know how to separate
the two; it is standard chemistry.45  And because enantiomers normally have
different properties, they could reasonably expect to succeed in most cases in
41 See Michel Eichelbaum & Annette S. Gross, Stereochemical Aspects of Drug Action and
Disposition, in 28 ADVANCES IN DRUG RES. 1, 7–8, 10 tbl.2 (Bernard Testa & Urs A. Meyer
eds., 1996) (collecting examples of drugs where activity is mainly associated with one ste-
reoisomer).  For example, S-ofloxacin is more than ten times as potent an antibiotic than
R-ofloxacin. Id. at 10 tbl.2.  In a natural or an achiral synthetic environment, you will get
racemic mixtures.  Variations in mixture percentages happen when you are trying to make
one enantiomer over the other and not succeeding very well.
42 For example, (R)-albuterol is a bronchodilator, but (S)-albuterol indirectly inhibits
this activity. See Agranat et al., supra note 39, at 760; see also Eichelbaum & Gross, supra
note 41, at 9 (describing how a number of 1,4-dihydropyridines elicit opposite effects on
the same receptors).
43 For example, Plavix, (+)-methyl alpha-5(4,5,6,7-tetrahydro(3,2-c)thienopyridyl)(2-
chlorophenyl)-acetate, is responsible for all the positive antiplatelet activity, whereas the
negative isomer is responsible for all the neurotoxicity.  Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,
550 F.3d 1075, 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Eichelbaum & Gross, supra note 41, at
48 (describing how the side effects of racemic L-DOPA and D-penicillamine are entirely
due to the inactive enantiomer).
44 It is extremely common that drugs are more effective in one enantiomer than
another.  Indeed, it is rare that each enantiomer has equal effects. See Eichelbaum &
Gross, supra note 41, at 4 (“The situation that both enantiomers are equipotent is rather
seldomly encountered.  In most cases differences in activity in either qualitative or quanti-
tative terms are observed between enantiomers.”)  Enantiomers would only have the same
effect if the target binding site were achiral, and pretty much every molecule in your body
of reasonable size is chiral.  Certainly all proteins are.
45 See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1302
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Moreover, the ’944 patent specifically taught that stereoisomers of
ramipril ‘can be separated by conventional chromatographic or fractional crystallization
methods.’  Aventis’s protestations notwithstanding, there is no evidence that separating
5(S) and SSSSR ramipril was outside the capability of an ordinarily skilled artisan.” (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,348,944 col. 10, 11. 28–31 (issued Sept. 20,
1944))).
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changing the characteristics of the racemic mixture, though not necessarily
to succeed as well as they would if a multiplier effect were triggered.  Further,
they might also be motivated to try a chiral switch by the known—but uncer-
tain—possibility of such a multiplier effect.  In these cases, the chiral switch is
obvious to try, but the actual effects of the switch may turn out to be
unexpected.46
B. Confusion in the Caselaw
Courts since KSR have struggled with cases in which “obviousness to try”
points in one direction and unexpected results in another.  Those issues
come up with particular frequency in cases involving enantiomers and other
efforts to modify a known chemical compound in well-understood ways.
1. Cases Giving Primacy to Obviousness to Try
On the one hand, a number of cases have held that a modification of an
existing chemical that is expected to have positive results is obvious to try,
and therefore obvious, even if the results are better than expected.  In Hoff-
mann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,47 for example, the Federal Circuit held that
it was obvious to try a 150-mg, once-monthly, time-release dose of a chemical
that was already being provided in a 5-mg daily dose, where the prior art
included one reference disclosing the “total-dose concept” and a second ref-
erence establishing the optimal daily dose.48  When the monthly dose was
actually tested, it turned out to have somewhat better bioavailability than a
mere linear projection (5 mg per day x 30 days per month = 150 mg) would
By contrast, in the rare case in which the process of isolating the enantiomer is itself
new and surprising, the invention may be patentable. See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharm.,
Inc., 501 F.3d 1263, 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that resolving a racemic mixture
of citalopram was not obvious because typical processes used to isolate enantiomers (like
chiral HPLC) were known to fail, and that the method ultimately used as a last resort was
one that “others of skill in the art would have similarly hesitated [to use] because there was
a real possibility that the resolved intermediate would re-racemize during the attempt to
convert it from the diol intermediate enantiomer to the desired citalopram enantiomer”).
46 Chris Holman argues that “there is no general expectation that separating a race-
mate into its constituent enantiomers will provide any benefit.”  Christopher M. Holman,
In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for Pharmaceuti-
cal Patent Examination 50 IND. L. REV (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 15), https://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2833983.  But that seems to misunderstand
the level of generality at which we should ask the scientific question.  The benefits of enan-
tiomers are uncertain.  Sometimes they will have benefits and no costs; other times they
will have costs and no benefits; and still other times they may have both.  But the fact that
any particular enantiomer might or might not provide a benefit shouldn’t matter.  The fact
that enantiomers often do have benefits over racemates motivates scientists to try new ones
to see if they confer such a benefit, just as the fact that a general area that is known to
contain gold will motivate a search even though no one knows whether a particular plot of
land will contain gold or not.
47 Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 748 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
48 Id. at 1332.
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suggest.49  The patentee, Roche, argued that the nonlinear bioavailability of
the drug was an unexpected result, but the court said that:
[I]mproved efficacy does not rebut the strong showing that the prior art
disclosed monthly dosing and that there was a reason to set that dose at 150
mg.  The evidence of superior efficacy does nothing to undercut the show-
ing that there was a reasonable expectation of success with the 150 mg
monthly dose, even if the level of success may have turned out to be some-
what greater than would have been expected.50
Further, the inventor need not be motivated by the desire to produce
the actual result, as long as he is motivated to do work that does in fact pro-
duce that result.  If a PHOSITA would have reason to produce the new chem-
ical, the fact that the inventor’s own motivation did not include an
expectation of the particular result doesn’t matter.  Thus, in Par Pharmaceuti-
cal, Inc. v. TWi Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 the patentee was surprised to learn that
its combination of nanoparticles with an existing chemical eliminated the
need to take the drug with food.52  But the court held that that fact did not
render the invention nonobvious because the PHOSITA would have been
motivated to make the combination for a different reason—to decrease vis-
cosity and reduce interpatient variability.53  Thus, while the invention did
have an unexpected result, it didn’t matter, because the PHOSITA would
have made the invention anyway.
Hoffman-La Roche is the clearest statement in the Federal Circuit of the
idea that obviousness to try coupled with a reasonable expectation of success
outweighs the unexpected nature of the results.  But other Federal Circuit
decisions have produced the same result, sometimes by concluding that if an
invention was obvious to try and the PHOSITA reasonably expected it to suc-
ceed, succeeding could not be “unexpected.”  Thus, in Novo Nordisk A/S v.
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd.,54 the patent examiner had repeatedly
rejected a combination of two known diabetes drugs as obvious to try, but on
the fifth resubmission backed down in the face of a study with questionable
statistical significance that showed synergistic effects.55  The district court
found that some synergistic effect would have been expected by the state of
the art, and that the level of synergy reported by the plaintiff’s results was
expected in view of the state of the art at the time.56  The Federal Circuit
affirmed, saying the “unexpected results” actually were expected because syn-
49 Id. at 1334.
50 Id. (citation omitted) (citing In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1099 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding that a difference in degree of anticholinergic effect, which was not so
“appreciable” that “the difference was really unexpected,” did not rebut the prima facie
case of obviousness)).  Notably, the Merck case, decided before KSR and obviousness to try,
seems to point in a different direction than Hoffman-La Roche.
51 Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
52 Id. at 1189, 1193.
53 Id. at 1197–98.
54 719 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
55 Id. at 1349–51.
56 Id. at 1352.
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ergy—some sort of non-linear benefit from combination—could itself be an
expected result.57  And in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,58 while the panel did not
directly discuss the tension between the two doctrines, it made a finding of
obviousness on the basis of obviousness to try.59  Three judges, dissenting
from the court’s refusal to rehear the case en banc, felt that unexpected
results trumped obviousness to try.60
The Federal Circuit applied the primacy of obviousness to try to stereo-
isomers in Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd.61 There, the court
held that:
[I]f it is known that some desirable property of a mixture derives in whole or
in part from a particular one of its components, or if the prior art would
provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with reason to believe that this is
so, the purified compound is prima facie obvious over the mixture even
without an explicit teaching that the ingredient should be concentrated or
purified.  Ordinarily, one expects a concentrated or purified ingredient to
retain the same properties it exhibited in a mixture, and for those properties
to be amplified when the ingredient is concentrated or purified.62
Aventis tried to argue that there were unexpected results due to
increased potency.  Specifically, it argued that the substantially pure isomer
claimed—the SSSSS isomer—is eighteen times as potent as the next most
potent isomer—RRSSS.  The court said that increased potency as between
the SSSSS and RRSSS isomers may well be unexpected, but the prior art was a
mixture that did not include the RRSSS isomer, and so Aventis had to show
that the SSSSS isomer was unexpectedly more potent than that prior art mix-
ture.  It was not, because the SSSSS isomer was the only active component of
the prior art mixture.63  In other words, once it was obvious to identify the
active isomer from a mixture, the fact that that isomer had surprising proper-
57 Id. at 1355–56.
58 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Torrent Pharm.
Ltd. v. Novartis AG, No. IPR2014-00784, at 15 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2015) (“[T]he fact that
the inventors of the ’283 patent may have discovered a new advantage of a combination of
prior-art ingredients is not sufficient to render the claims of the ’283 patent patentable, as
long as there was some reason to combine the prior-art teachings that those ingredients
should be used.”).
59 Pfizer, Inc., 480 F.3d at 1365–68.  While the (pre-KSR) court acknowledged that
“obvious to try” was not a proper reason to invalidate a patent, it nevertheless proceeded to
invalidate this one because it was the result of “routine testing.” Id.
60 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denying petition for
rehearing).  Now post-KSR, the dissenters felt that the panel did not properly defer to the
district court’s finding of unexpected physical properties, and that those unexpected
results rendered the patent valid. Id. at 1379–80 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1382–83
(Lourie, J., dissenting); id. at 1383–84 (Rader, J., dissenting).
61 Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
62 Id. at 1301–02.
63 Id. at 1302.
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ties on its own didn’t matter, because those properties were already part of
the known mixture.64
To similar effect is Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Teva, a non-stereoisomer case.65
There, the court rejected a claim that a small modification to an existing
chemical was patentable because the properties of the modified drug were
unexpected.  As the court explained, the PHOSITA understands that “a
chemist in drug development would seek to make small, conservative
changes to that structure.  In drug development, it is common to modify a
lead compound in an effort to ‘obtain a compound with better activity.’”66
While the modified drug later turned out to have unexpected properties, the
court held that “[u]nexpected properties . . . do not necessarily guarantee
that a new compound is nonobvious.  While a ‘marked superiority’ in an
expected property may be enough in some circumstances to render a com-
pound patentable, a ‘mere difference in degree’ is insufficient.”67  That is
particularly true when, as here, the deficiency in the prior art that the new
invention unexpectedly solved was not itself known at the time the patent was
filed.  If the PHOSITA would be motivated to make simple changes to the
invention, the fact that those simple changes led to unpredicted results did
not render the invention obvious.  Three judges dissented from the refusal to
take the case en banc, arguing that “an unexpected result or property is the
touchstone of nonobviousness” and necessarily defeats an obviousness
claim.68
2. Cases Giving Primacy to Unexpected Results
At the same time, other Federal Circuit decisions have rejected obvi-
ousness to try when the results were unexpected.  Often, these cases take the
form of a conclusion that there were too many choices to make it obvious to
try any one of them.  The unexpected results of the path taken are used as
evidence to bolster the idea that there was no reasonable expectation of suc-
cess in the first place.  Thus, in Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Alphapharm
Pty., Ltd.,69 the challenger tried to argue that “techniques of homologation
and ring-walking would have been ‘obvious to try’” with respect to the paten-
64 See also In re Adamson, 275 F.2d 952, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (holding an enantiomer
obvious in view of the racemate when it was “particularly expected” that the specific enanti-
omer would have the observed properties).
65 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
66 Id. at 974 (quoting Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
67 Id. at 977 (first quoting In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 392 (C.C.P.A. 1963); and then
quoting In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1344 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
68 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  A fourth judge dis-
sented on different, narrower grounds. Id. at 1353–54 (Taranto, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
69 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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tee’s modification of the prior art compound.70  The court rejected that
argument: “Rather than identify predictable solutions for antidiabetic treat-
ment, the prior art disclosed a broad selection of compounds any one of
which could have been selected as a lead compound for further investiga-
tion.”71  The compound the patentees selected had negative properties and
so was not the obvious choice.  It also had unexpected results in terms of
reduced toxicity, a fact the court used to bolster the conclusion that this was
not the obvious compound to try.72
Similarly, in In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litigation,73 the obvi-
ousness-to-try argument was explicitly overcome by proof of secondary con-
siderations, including the unexpected result of reduced toxicity as compared
to the lead compound, but also the fact that the prior art “taught away” from
the invention:
We agree that “obvious to try” was negated by the general skepticism
concerning pyrimidine-based statins, the fact that other pharmaceutical
companies had abandoned this general structure, and the evidence that the
prior art taught a preference not for hydrophilic substituents but for lipo-
philic substituents at the C2 position.74
Notably, the obvious-to-try argument here was a weak one.  The accused
infringer argued that insertion of a sylfonyl group at position C2 was one of a
finite number of predictable solutions, but did not point to some specific
reason the PHOSITA would try that particular combination.75
70 Id. at 1359.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1361–62.  For criticism of the lead compound doctrine as overly rigid and
inconsistent with KSR, see Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test for New Phar-
maceutical Compounds: Gobbledygook? (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 271, 2015), http://ssrn.com.abstract=2486559.
One way to read Takeda is that because the prior art suggested there were negative
properties of the compound, the case really involved teaching away and not merely unex-
pected results.  But the court’s reasoning was not explicitly based on teaching away.
73 In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
74 Id. at 518 (citation omitted) (citing Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357).
75 Id.; accord Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  There,
the court found many pieces of objective evidence to defeat obviousness: (1) people had
been trying to find a shelf-stable steroid/vitamin D formulation for over a decade; (2) the
prior art taught away from combining them for stability reasons; (3) the record included
extensive evidence of unexpected results; and (4) none of the combination examples in
the prior art were shelf-stable or acknowledged the stability problem. Id. at 1334–35.
Without more, and especially in the face of such strong objective indicia of
nonobviousness discussed infra, the Board erred by using hindsight to determine
that the addition of Serup’s or Dikstein’s vitamin D analog to Turi’s formulation
would have been obvious.
. . . .
Here, the objective indicia—taken in sum—are the most “probative evidence
of nonobviousness . . . enabl[ing] the court to avert the trap of hindsight.”
Id. at 1356, 1359 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).  Turning to “obvious to try,” the
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While none of these cases explicitly privilege unexpected results over
obviousness to try, several Federal Circuit judges have proposed doing so in
dissents.  Judge Newman, dissenting in Caraco, argued that the discovery of
the synergistic effect should have made combination nonobvious.76  She spe-
cifically expressed her view that “obvious to try” is limited to predictable
results.77  She took the same view in dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.78  Judge Lourie’s and Judge Rader’s dis-
senting opinions in that case also suggested that they thought obviousness to
try had little application in a case with unexpected results.79
Some enantiomer cases, too, have privileged unexpected results over
obviousness to try.  In Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.,80 the court found that
the patented dextrorotatory isomer81 was not obvious in light of the known
court held that combinations of more than eight different classes of additives and more
than ten different categories of composition forms resulted in choices too broad for the
invention to be obvious to try. Id. at 1356.  The court noted the time lapse between the
cited references, finding them to be background knowledge that did not even identify the
problem, not a recitation of known, finite solutions to a problem. Id. at 1356–57.  Further-
more, there was no reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 1357; see also Mintz v. Dietz &
Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting on the basis of unexpected
results an “obvious-to-try” argument that was really just a hindsight application of common
sense).
76 See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Newman, J., dissenting in part).
77 Id.
78 488 F.3d 1377, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“The panel’s application of the obvious-to-try standard is in direct
conflict with precedent . . . . The panel further erred in declining to give weight to these
acknowledged ‘secondary considerations’ of unexpected results.”).
79 Id. at 1382 (Lourie, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that
the panel failed to defer to the findings of fact made by the district court, indicating that
the salt’s properties were unexpected); id. at 1384 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“‘[O]bvious to try’ jurisprudence has a very limited application in
cases of this nature.  With unpredictable pharmaceutical inventions, this court more wisely
employs a reasonable expectation of success analysis.”).  Some commentators have taken
this position as well. See, e.g., Scott R. Conley, Irrational Behavior, Hindsight, and Patentabil-
ity: Balancing the “Obvious to Try” Test with Unexpected Results, 51 IDEA 271, 272 (2011)
(“[T]here must be a reasonable factor to rebut obviousness found through the ‘obvious to
try ’ test.  This factor should focus on significant unexpected results of the invention
because if a result is truly unexpected, then the invention could not have been obvious.”);
Jonathan M. Spenner, Obvious-to-Try Obviousness of Chemical Enantiomers in View of Pre- and
Post-KSR Analysis, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 475, 491 (2008) (“[U]nexpected
results can be used to show retrospectively that an invention would have been nonobvious
even though it would have been considered obvious by a POSITA prospectively without the
benefit of knowing the unexpected results.”).
80 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
81 Aside from differing interaction with other chiral molecules, the only observable
difference between mirror-image stereoisomers is the direction in which they rotate plane-
polarized light.  The “dextrorotatory isomer” is the stereoisomer that rotates plane-
polarized light to the right (also called the positive (+) enantiomer), and the “levorotatory
isomer” is the stereoisomer that rotates plane-polarized light to the left (also known as the
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racemic mixture.82  Racemates of two other thienopyridines had been
resolved, and there was no observed advantage to separation in either case.83
The chemical literature indicated at least ten separation techniques that
could be tried, and Sanofi’s actual approach—diasteromeric salt formation—
required five months of experimenting with “diverse salt-forming composi-
tions and conditions, in the hope of coming upon a lucky combination of
reagents that will preferentially select one of the enantiomers and crystallize
from the solution in optically pure form.”84
Sanofi was the rare case in which the enantiomers ultimately patented
exhibited “absolute stereoselectivity”—one isomer was responsible for all the
therapeutic activity and the other was responsible for all the neurotoxicity.85
All the experts agreed that such absolute selectivity was rare and unpredict-
able.86  Usually, if one is more biologically active than the other, it causes
both the therapeutic effects and side effects.87  Thus, “a person of ordinary
skill in this field would not reasonably have predicted that the dextrorotatory
enantiomer would provide all of the antiplatelet activity and none of the
adverse neurotoxicity.  Clear error has not been shown in this finding, and in
the conclusion of nonobviousness based thereon.”88  It affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that,
Whether or not it may have been “obvious to try” separating the enantiomers
of PCR 4099 . . . , the wide range of possible outcomes and the relative
unlikelihood that the resulting compound would exhibit the maximal
increase in anti-platelet aggregation activity and the absence of neurotoxicity
makes clopidogrel bisulfate non-obvious.89
C. Beyond Enantiomers
While enantiomers are an important example of the conflict between
obviousness to try and unexpected results, they are not the only one.
Another important class of pharmaceutical patents involves salts.  A salt is a
pH-neutral chemical, neither acidic nor basic.  Many drugs are “free bases”
that are basic rather than acidic.  Some of those basic compounds have unde-
sirable physical properties.  As with enantiomers, inventors who discover a
free base drug may therefore be motivated to identify salts of those drugs.
The salt may have different chemical properties than the free base, but it
negative (-) enantiomer).  This is why enantiomers are sometimes called “optical iso-
mers”—an enantiomerically pure compound that rotates plane-polarized light is “optically
active.” OUELLETTE & RAWN, supra note 36, at 245–47.
82 Sanofi-Synthelabo, 550 F.3d at 1090.
83 Id. at 1080.




88 Id. at 1087.
89 Id. at 1089 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sanofi-Synthelabo v.
Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
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turns out to be difficult to predict which salt forms will have which physical
properties.90
Salts, then, present an issue similar to enantiomers: we know it will often
be desirable to produce the salt form of a known chemical, but we can’t
predict exactly when a particular salt will have a particular benefit.  The Fed-
eral Circuit held in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. that a patent claim to “the besy-
late salt of amlodipine” was obvious to try where the prior art identified a
number of candidate salts of the drug, but not besylate salt.91  While the
exact properties of the besylate salt were unpredictable, there was “a strong
suggestion that any and all pharmaceutically-acceptable anions would
form . . . salts and would work.”92  Nonetheless, many pharmaceutical patents
are in the form of salts of existing compounds, and courts remain split over
whether it is obvious to produce a particular salt.93  The issues in the salt
cases have important similarities to the enantiomer cases.
Nor is the conflict limited to chemical and pharmaceutical inventions.
One might imagine any number of inventions whose result is a surprise but
that were the product of a straightforward creative process designed to
achieve some different result.  There are plant patent cases that present the
question because standard breeding techniques lead to surprising results.94
Accidental inventions may also present the conflict in many cases.  While a
true accidental invention like Fleming’s discovery of the medicinal properties
of penicillin would not be something obvious to try, many accidental inven-
tions are really discoveries of the unexpected property of something that was
created for a different purpose.95  The conflict may even arise with com-
puter-generated inventions in which AI systems may produce surprising
results while running established programs.96  Any of those inventions might
well be unpatentable under the obvious-to-try standard, since they would
90 Simon N. Black et al., Structure, Solubility, Screening, and Synthesis of Molecular Salts, 96
J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 1053, 1053 (2007) (“[A]t present, the ability to predict which salt
forms will have desirable physical properties is essentially nonexistent.”).
91 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
92 Id.
93 Valeant Int’l (Barbados) SRL v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 10-20526, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 128742, at *26 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 534 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding a
salt nonobvious because “salt selection is inherently unpredictable”).
94 See, e.g., Ex parte Wong, No. 93-3238, 1994 WL 1709498 (B.P.A.I. July 6, 1994).  For a
discussion of that case and how it would fare after KSR, see Mark D. Janis, Non-Obvious
Plants 26–28 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on filed with author).
95 For a discussion of various examples, including the Post-It note, penicillin, vulcan-
ized rubber, and the pacemaker, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110
MICH. L. REV. 709, 733–34 (2012).  For additional examples, including dynamite, the pho-
nograph, X-rays, Teflon, and Velcro, see DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DAR-
WINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY 35–36 (1999); see also Paul Thagard & David Croft,
Scientific Discovery and Technological Innovation: Ulcers, Dinosaur Extinction, and the Program-
ming Language Java, in MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 125, 126 (Lorenzo
Magnani et al. eds., 1999).
96 See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent
Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2016) (discussing the problem of inventions generated by
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have been tried anyway.  At the least, the patentee should have to show that
the invention lay in recognizing the unexpected result, not in the mere gen-
eration of an easily-appreciated result by means of ordinary science.
III. EXPECTING THE UNEXPECTED
Both on the general question of the relationship between obviousness to
try and unexpected results, and on the specific question of whether isolating
enantiomers is obvious even if it produces a surprising result, Federal Circuit
decisions in the eight years since KSR are directly at odds.97  In this Part, I
discuss how that conflict should be resolved.
A. Obviousness to Try and the Purpose of Obviousness
The key to answering that question lies in understanding the essential
purpose of obviousness law.  That purpose is to ensure that we grant patents
only on inventions the world would not otherwise obtain.98  We don’t grant
patents on obvious inventions, not merely because doing so might prevent
scientists from engaging in the normal course of their research,99 but
because if scientists are already motivated to try something, we shouldn’t
need the grant of a patent to induce people to do it.  Denying patents to
inventions that are obvious to try serves that purpose.  If a PHOSITA is moti-
vated to try to make an invention and has a clear path to success, the
PHOSITA will try and will succeed without the incentive of a patent.  The fact
that that path led to unexpected results is simply an added benefit.  But it is
not a benefit induced by the promise of a patent; the PHOSITA was going to
try anyway.100
computers and concluding that “being the first human to discover a computer’s patentable
result” should not be sufficient for patentability).
97 Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
375, 427 (2008) (“These cases are not necessarily inconsistent with each other.  Each opin-
ion reviews a different evidentiary record to determine whether the prior art would have
motivated a PHOSITA to isolate the claimed isomer with a reasonable expectation of suc-
cess, whether the prior art taught the PHOSITA how to do so, and whether the isolated
molecule exhibits surprising properties.  The facts of each case are unique.  Nonetheless, it
is difficult to find a basis for distinguishing the cases that would provide meaningful gui-
dance in future cases.”).
98 Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1.
99 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.  Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent
system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
100 While I have couched this argument in terms of inducement theory, the same result
should obtain under Tim Holbrook’s possession theory of obviousness.  Holbrook explains
that obviousness to try in fact demonstrates the public’s constructive possession of the
invention.  Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY
L.J. 987, 1035 (2016).
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Unexpected results do not themselves deny that logic; they are merely
evidence that hints that an invention was not well understood until it was
made.  That doesn’t mean they aren’t a legitimate part of the obviousness
inquiry.  Truly unexpected results may cause us to question whether the
PHOSITA really had a reasonable expectation of success, and we should
worry about hindsight bias in making that assessment.101  Evidence that the
prior art actually taught away from the invention may lead us to further ques-
tion whether the invention was really obvious to try.  But if they really did
expect success (as in the enantiomer cases), scientists in the field would have
produced the invention, unexpected results and all, without the incentive of
a patent.  That is most evident when, as sometimes happens, the unexpected
results aren’t even discovered until after the patent application is filed.102  It
seems hard to conclude, as some courts have, that unexpected results that
weren’t even known at the time of the patent application indicate a lack of
motivation to try the patented invention.103
Objective evidence of unexpected results in this sense really is a “secon-
dary” consideration.  It is indirect evidence we use to help predict what obvi-
ousness to try tells us directly: whether the PHOSITA would develop the
invention without the promise of a patent.  When the two are in conflict,
then, obviousness to try should prevail as a matter of logic.  By contrast,
proper evidence of teaching away would discourage scientists from trying the
invention, and therefore could rebut a case of obviousness to try.  Thus, new
chemicals like enantiomers and salts that are known, variant types on existing
drugs should be treated as presumptively obvious under the new law.104
One complication is the possibility that normal science itself depends on the incen-
tives of patents for the results of that work, at least when those results are surprisingly
good.  Greg Mandel makes this argument.  Gregory N. Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem:
How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 57 (2008).  But if that is true, it is the obviousness doctrine itself that would have to
be revisited.
101 Conley, supra note 79, at 271.  For an experimental assessment of hindsight bias in
obviousness, see Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
102 See, e.g., Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., 748 F.3d 1354,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655
F.3d 1291, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT AND FDA LAW § 1.86 (2015 ed.).
103 See Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious Confusion over Properties Discovered After a Patent Appli-
cation, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015) (making this point).
Patent law sometimes encounters the opposite phenomenon—patent applications
filed based on observed unexpected results that later prove inaccurate.  For a discussion of
the problems this creates, see Jacob Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE
L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
104 See UPADHYE, supra note 102, § 1.87 (reaching this conclusion).  As Upadhye points
out, any enantiomer of a known drug will either have a different effect than the racemate
or not, but that is a fact that is inherent to the enantiomer, not the product of invention.
I’m not sure it should matter whether the patent claims the unexpected result.  It is
true that many of the claims are to products standing alone and do not explicitly limit
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So understood, KSR can be seen in broader context as part of a funda-
mental shift in how we think about obviousness.  The pre-KSR chemical cases
focus on whether the product of the inventive process would have been obvi-
ous to the PHOSITA.  This explains the almost-exclusive focus on the struc-
ture of the resulting chemical, a focus that shows up not just in obviousness
law but in other patent doctrines as well.105  Unexpected results fit easily
within that framework, because if the results are unexpected the inventive
process produced a nonobvious end product.  By contrast, KSR represents a
shift in focus from the end product to the process of producing that product.106
If the PHOSITA would be motivated to invent the claimed product, the fact
that the thing produced is not what she anticipated shouldn’t matter.107
That conceptual focus may impact not just chemical cases, but cases involving
accidental inventions as well.
B. Should Pharma Be Different?
It seems clear that obviousness to try trumps unexpected results as a mat-
ter of law and patent theory.  It is less clear that we should be happy with that
result as a policy matter.  In the pharmaceutical industry, where many of
these issues arise, inventions may be expensive even if they are relatively cer-
tain.  The development and testing of enantiomers to existing drugs is a
straightforward scientific process, one that is obvious to try in light of the
potential benefits of different isomers, but it can also be expensive and time-
consuming, as the Sanofi example described above illustrates.108  More
importantly, the process of getting FDA approval to sell a new drug is itself
expensive and time consuming even if the actual process of invention is
not.109  We generally don’t need or want market exclusivity to encourage
themselves to the unexpected result.  But the scope of a claim shouldn’t be affected by
whether an inherent property of a chemical is or is not claimed.  Any making or using of
the chemical would infringe that element regardless. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (2005).
105 For instance, chemical patent law has historically required a “lead compound” as
the focus for investigation and for the obviousness inquiry. See, e.g., Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr.
Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  And written description cases in
biotechnology focus on knowledge of the structure of a chemical, not its properties. See,
e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
106 See Cotropia, supra note 31, at 393.
107 See Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board seemed to believe that the ‘reasonable expectation of suc-
cess’ inquiry looked to whether one would reasonably expect the prior art references to
operate as those references intended once combined.  That is not the correct
inquiry . . . .”).
108 550 F.3d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
109 See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Develop-
ment Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the cost of a new drug to be
$802 million, unadjusted for inflation).  Notably, that number includes substantial market-
ing costs, which arguably should not count.
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commercialization of ideas we already have,110 but the pharmaceutical indus-
try may be an exception.111  Empirical evidence suggests that pharmaceuti-
cals are one of the few industries in which patents do more good than
harm.112  We should be reluctant to deny patent protection to a significant
class of pharmaceutical products.113  And we might worry that even if it is
obvious to try something and reasonable to expect success, scientists in indus-
tries like pharmaceuticals won’t actually try the new thing if it is too expen-
sive.  For that reason, Ben Roin has argued that we should grant patents on
obvious and even already-known inventions in the pharmaceutical indus-
try.114  His idea is to induce not invention, but rather the commercialization
of the invention once it has been made.115
110 There is a substantial literature on the theory of patents as designed to encourage
not invention, but commercialization of existing knowledge. See Michael Abramowicz, The
Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1106 (2007) (identifying
concern over sufficiently incentivizing commercialization); Michael Abramowicz & John F.
Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 339–40 (2008)
(discussing the interplay of intellectual property rights and market experimentation); F.
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV.
697, 710 (2001) (“[A]lthough a simple reward for inventive effort might provide adequate
incentives for invention itself, the nascent invention may never reach a single consumer
without . . . incentives to commercialize.”); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275–80 (1977) (exploring the role played by the patent
system in securing returns on investment); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62
STAN. L. REV. 341, 396 (2010) (proposing creation of “commercialization patents”).
I have critiqued that claim elsewhere, see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor,
110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012); Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Patent Licensing, Technol-
ogy Transfer, and Innovation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 188, 190–91 (2016), and I won’t repeat
those criticisms here.
111 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 139–41 (2004) (criticizing commercialization theory as “fundamentally anti-
market,” but noting that the regulatory barriers in the pharmaceutical industry make it the
strongest candidate for application of that theory).
112 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK (2008).
113 Conley worries that if pharmaceutical inventors are denied patents for doing the
natural, logical thing, they will turn instead to irrational behavior or luck.  Conley, supra
note 79, at 271–72.  This is really a species of Roin’s claim that we should grant them a
patent for policy reasons even though the invention is in fact obvious, because otherwise
they won’t invest the time and money in commercializing the logical idea.
114 See Roin, supra note 1, at 503; see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1091; Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from
Cancer Clinical Trials (Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-79, 2013), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2353471.  Those who put existing drugs to a new use
can already obtain a patent on that new use, but use patents are generally considered
inferior to a patent on the chemical itself. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 231 (6th ed. 2013). But see Arti K. Rai & Grant Rice, Use
Patents Can Be Useful: The Case of Rescued Drugs, 6 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 248 (2014)
(arguing that use patents can nonetheless be valuable).
115 See Roin, supra note 1, at 503.
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Nonetheless, I don’t believe the economic characteristics of pharmaceu-
tical inventions compel us to give a preference to unexpected results in cases
where an invention is obvious to try.  Patent law flirted with protecting things
that are straightforward but expensive to develop in a series of biotechnology
cases in the 1990s.116  Those cases granted patents to human gene sequences
identified from the amino acid sequence they expressed.  That process was
time consuming—many possible gene sequences could have coded for any
given amino acid sequence—but its outcome was predictable.117  But once
KSR was decided in 2007, the Federal Circuit overruled those cases, holding
that they were inconsistent with the logic of obviousness to try.118  Intellec-
tual property law more generally has rejected claims for protection of things
that are not creative, but simply costly or a lot of work to produce.  Copyright
law, for instance, refuses to protect databases that lack creativity even if they
are costly to compile.119
The reason is that whatever the merits of exclusivity as compensation for
the expense of producing something, it is fundamentally not what the patent
system is about.  The logic of Roin’s argument is, at base, not an argument
for a patent, but for some form of non-patent regulatory exclusivity.  Notably,
it would apply not only to cases that led to unexpected results, but even to
cases in which the enantiomer produced had perfectly predictable results.  It
is not invention that Roin would reward, but merely the act of going through
the regulatory process.  That is a reasonable argument for regulatory inter-
vention to help subsidize the pharmaceutical industry (or, alternatively, to
make the process of FDA approval of drugs quicker and cheaper).  But it is
not, at base, an argument for granting a patent.
We do want people to find and produce enantiomers, at least in the
cases where we can separate some of the side effects from the active ingredi-
ent effects.  But three final considerations lead me to conclude that denying
patents to enantiomers or biotechnological inventions that are obvious to try
should not worry us unduly as a policy matter.  First, pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology already do qualify for various forms of regulatory exclusivity
outside the patent system.  A new chemical entity—including a new enanti-
omer—approved by the FDA is entitled to five years of regulatory exclusivity
116 See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781,
785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
117 Protein-synthesizing enzymes in the body determine which amino acid to use next
by reading a three-base pair DNA sequence called a codon.  There are sixty-four distinct
codons that spell amino acids, but only twenty-one human amino acids.  Thus, many possi-
ble gene sequences could code for a protein made up of many different amino acids.  For a
primer on the science, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2015 CASE AND STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT app. A (2015).  In Bell, the
court noted that there were 1036 possible gene sequences that could theoretically code for
the human amino acid sequence Bell discovered. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
118 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
119 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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regardless of what patent law provides.120  That regulatory exclusivity is not
subject to invalidation or any of the remedial limits of patent law.  It can be
extended beyond five years for various reasons, including pediatric testing or
a small patient base.121  Biological products get even more protection—
twelve years of data exclusivity before a biosimilar can seek FDA approval
based on its similarity to an FDA-approved product.122  Several scholars have
suggested that regulatory exclusivity, not patent law, is best suited to protect-
ing heavily regulated industries like pharmaceuticals.123  I think there are
costs as well as benefits to regulatory exclusivity.  But it seems a better concep-
tual fit for predictable but unexpected results than patent law.
Second, the cost and delay associated with regulatory approval for fol-
low-on drugs like enantiomers are substantially lower than for truly new
chemical entities.  In 1992, the FDA issued guidance encouraging NDA appli-
120 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012) (“If an application submitted under subsection
(b) of this section for a drug, no active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active
ingredient) of which has been approved in any other application under subsection (b) of
this section, is approved . . . no application may be submitted under this subsection which
refers to the drug for which the subsection (b) application was submitted before the expi-
ration of five years from the date of the approval of the application under subsection (b) of
this section. . . .”).
The FDA’s interpretation of that provision is discussed at FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, NEW CHEMICAL ENTITY EXCLUSIVITY DETERMINATIONS
FOR CERTAIN FIXED-COMBINATION DRUG PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2014), http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/
ucm386685.pdf; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(u) (providing that exclusivity specifically to single-
enantiomer versions of previously approved racemates as of 2007); JOHN R. THOMAS, PHAR-
MACEUTICAL PATENT LAW (3d ed. 2015) (discussing section 355(u)); Agranat et al., supra
note 39, at 755–56 (describing how, before the Food and Drug Administration Amend-
ments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), the FDA did not classify enantiomers of existing racemic
drugs as new chemical entities (NCE), but categorized them on a case-by-case basis as new
formulations or new derivatives (but never as a new molecular entity)); Kyle Faget, Why
FDCA Section 505(u) Should Not Concern Us Greatly, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 453,
453–54 (2009) (describing how the FDAAA allowed enantiomers of previously approved
racemic mixtures to get five years of market exclusivity).
121 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)–(b) (offering six additional months of exclusivity in exchange
for testing the effects of the drug on children); 21 C.F.R. § 316.31 (2015) (setting out
requirements for obtaining seven years of exclusivity for “orphan drugs” that serve only a
small patient population).
122 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012).
123 See, e.g., Jaime F. Ca´rdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and
Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301,
1376–81 (2014); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007); John R Thomas, The End of “Patent Medicines”?
Thoughts on the Rise of Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015).  For a discus-
sion of the complex interrelationship between patent and regulatory exclusivity in encour-
aging invention, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 477 (2003); cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92
TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (discussing the need to compare patents to other government
efforts to promote innovation, albeit not including regulatory exclusivities).
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cants to characterize each enantiomer and to develop single-enantiomer
drugs.124  That guidance indicates that:
 To develop a single stereoisomer from a mixture that has already been
studied non-clinically, an abbreviated, appropriate pharmacology/toxicol-
ogy evaluation could be conducted to allow the existing knowledge of the
racemate available to the sponsor to be applied to the pure stereoisomer. . . .
If there is no difference between the toxicological profile of the single stere-
oisomeric product and the racemate, no further studies would be
needed.125
Thus, pharmaceutical companies that have already received FDA
approval for a racemate do not need to restart the process with a full new
drug application for an enantiomer, but instead can piggyback on the work
they had already done for the racemate in finding the optimal enantiomer.
And the government itself motivates them to do so.
Finally, separate, later-filed patents on enantiomers, delayed-release ver-
sions, and other modifications of existing drugs arguably do more harm than
good to society.  They permit a practice known as “evergreening”—making
minor modifications to existing drug patents in order to avoid facing generic
competition as the basic patent on a drug expires.126  While patent law theo-
retically prohibits “double patenting”—obtaining more than one patent on
the same invention127—in practice pharmaceutical companies often obtain
follow-on patents on trivial variants of their basic chemical once the initial
patent is about to expire.128  Pharmaceutical patent owners use these new
patents not to dramatically improve medical outcomes, but to produce what
is essentially the same drug from the patient’s perspective.  But because cur-
rent law often gives them a patent on the basis of a showing of unexpected
results in these modifications, they can extend for years and even decades
their ability to exclude generic competitors from the market.  That is particu-
larly true when patent owners couple these new patents with regulatory gam-




126 For a discussion of evergreening, see for example C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 629 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continua-
tions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004); cf. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do
Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 613 (2011) (noting the rising num-
ber of patents per marketed drug); Lisa L. Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to
Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010) (same).
127 See, e.g., Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
128 For discussion of this practice and criticism of the narrow modern application of the
double-patenting doctrine, see Douglas L. Rogers, Double Patenting: Follow-On Pharmaceuti-
cal Patents that Suppress Competition (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 324, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2709067.
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ing strategies like “product-hopping,” taking the old version of the drug off
the market as its patent expires and replacing it with the slightly modified
form.129  The benefit to society from the new version may be slight, but the
reduction in competition can be substantial.130  The obvious-to-try patents
enabled by the unexpected results doctrine, then, are not the sort of pharma-
ceutical patents society should encourage.
This is not to say that we shouldn’t encourage pharmaceutical compa-
nies to identify and produce enantiomers.  But the practice of first patenting
a racemate and then separately patenting an enantiomer years later is prob-
lematic.  It is better to encourage pharmaceutical companies to identify the
enantiomer that has the therapeutic benefit at the outset, rather than giving
them extra patent life in exchange for waiting to do what was obvious for
them to try.131
CONCLUSION
There is a fundamental tension between two doctrines in patent law—
obviousness to try and unexpected results.  That tension has been reflected
in a series of cases that are irreconcilably in conflict.  I argue that when the
two conflict, obviousness to try must prevail because it is consistent with the
logic of obviousness doctrine.  The result will be a blow to pharmaceutical
patent owners who have come to rely on patents for inventions that are obvi-
ous to try.  But in the long run, it may be good for consumers, as well as for
the integrity of the patent system.
129 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3c1 (2002) (discussing the law and eco-
nomic effects of product-hopping); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and
Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685 (2009).  Courts are beginning to find that product-
hopping violates antitrust law. See New York ex rel Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d
638 (2d Cir. 2015); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del.
2006). But see Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC, No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 1736957
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting product-hopping claim it (wrongly) viewed as novel).  But it may
well be profitable for a pharmaceutical company to engage in the practice even if it is later
found to violate the antitrust laws.  Antitrust judgments to date have been dwarfed by the
profits the patentees stand to make by extending the life of their exclusivity with follow-on
patents. Cf. Hemphill, supra note 126 (measuring the social cost of pay-for-delay settle-
ments in the pharmaceutical industry).
130 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 423–28 (arguing that many pharmaceutical patents
were invalid even before KSR because they were follow-on patents directed to obvious vari-
ants of existing chemicals).
131 The FDA has been encouraging applicants to investigate enantiomers in their initial
filings.  The result has been that more and more initial drug filings are enantiomers, not
racemates. See Lin et al., supra note 40, at 4, 9–10 (documenting the number of each type
of chemical approved by the FDA).
